Abstract China has been a long-standing partner for Burma (Myanmar), providing important political, military and economic support. Burma's reform process poses new questions and challenges for China.
Introduction
Burma's post-2011 reforms have excited worldwide interest; attracted by the prospect of new political, economic and strategic opportunities. Although there have been testing times in the relationship, the lowest ebb being in the late 1960s, from the late 1980s China has been a long-standing partner of Burma through the years of military rule and international ostracism. During the decades of Burma's international isolation, China provided important diplomatic support at the United Nations and in the Asia-Pacific region, substantial military armaments, vital investment and infrastructural capacity-building assistance and a market for Burmese goods. For its part, China gained access to Burma's rich endowment of raw materials, energy resources and strategic access to the Indian Ocean.
However, Sino-Burmese relations are now at a crossroads. Burma's unfolding political landscape poses new questions and challenges for the Beijing leadership and its core national interests in its neighbour. China's political and strategic interests in Burma are important and cannot be discounted easily. But the reality is that Beijing's interests in Burma are primarily economicdriven by its need for strategic resources. This may change as China's specific engagement with international 'development' norms and practices evolves. Currently, though, Burma's 'development', as a Chinese national interest and as a foreign policy objective in its own right, is not central to China's approach. Development is salient insofar as any new spur to regional economic growth offers new economic opportunities and a potential magnifier effect. But this is a spin-off, a beneficial consequence of the pursuit of Chinese trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) intended to meet China's economic imperatives and reified through Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) operations. In the Chinese view, China's trade and FDI are not critical to Burmese development and are not inimical to it -quite the opposite. By trading and investing with Burma and by actively contributing to its infrastructural capacity building, China is also contributing substantively to Burma's 'development'. Indeed, from Burma's standpoint, this infrastructural capacity building is an imperative to achieve economic development. From an Asian perspective, this is also advantageous insofar as it comes with little or no 'strings attached'; no weighty requirements for human rights, democratisation or marketoriented reforms in return for economic relations or aid donor largesse.
China shares a 2,200km border with northern and eastern Burma. Building upon the historical circulation of goods, people and cultural influences, fraternal ties gained additional complexity during their respective periods of colonial and semi-colonial subjugation and nationalist and anti-colonial contests.
China's own economic reforms have taken 860 million Chinese citizens out of poverty and, despite its own continuing problems with widening inequality, has an experience and development story that ought to inform its understanding of its Burmese partner's development needs and China's potential contribution.
Yet, as in Africa, Latin America and parts of Southeast Asia, China's operations in Burma are controversial. There have been public protests against large-scale, high-profile mining, hydroelectric, forestry, mining, and energy projects involving Chinese SOEs; issues range from 'land-grabs', to lost employment and environmental degradation, and loss of livelihoods and food supplies. The Thein Sein leadership responded to this discontent in September 2012 by suspending work on the Letpadaung copper mine until 2015.
The following analysis examines issues surrounding China's presence in Burma. The article is structured in four parts. Following this introduction setting out the historic juncture at which Sino-Burmese relations now stand, the article explains Burma's current development profile; the political and economic gains arising from the post-2011 reform process, the continuing challenges it is actively and robustly seeking to confront and overcome, and the new national development framework and plan. It reviews Burma's overall trade, FDI and development assistance indicators as the principal means of achieving the government's development aims. The article then turns its attention to China's approach to Burma and outlines current Chinese engagement in the country and explains China's development approach to Burma in terms of China's national economic, political and security interests. The final part provides concluding comments.
Burma in development
Once one of Southeast Asia's economic jewels, years of military rule and international pariah status has distorted Burma's economic development. Burma is the largest territory on mainland Southeast Asia, and second largest in the region as a whole, after Indonesia. It shares borders with five neighbouring states, including India and China. The watchword for Burma today is 'potential' -human, economic and political. Economically, Burma's trade and inward investment are growing as domestic regulatory, legal, financial, corporate and administrative reforms take hold and the international community steadily dismantles its sanctions regimes against Burma. Politically, democratic reforms, elections and a commitment to 'good governance', the release of political prisoners and addressing of human rights abuses, an opening up of the space for civil society organisations and community groups and peace agreements with ethnic military groups have already transformed the landscape in quick time (Amnesty International 2013). Following political reforms and Burma's agreement with international donors on development assistance governance, assistance has flooded in (IndexMundi 2012) from European, Asia-Pacific and North American states and from Japan as well as international organisations such as the EU, World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), targeting a broad spectrum of development needs from infrastructure, health, education, policing, community enterprise, governance and administration to sovereign debt.
Burma is also resource-rich in its human and material assets. It has a population of over 61 million with an annual population growth rate of 1.1 per cent (ADB 2013), significant improvements in sanitation and water and in health with successful HIV/AIDS and TB programmes and morbidity and mortality rates for malaria already cut by half over the past seven years (UNDP 2013b) and an adult literacy rate of 92.3 per cent. Rangoon and Mandalay are cities with sizeable, and largely younger, populations of five and one million respectively, a ready workforce. Releasing this human potential is a vital necessity for Burma's future development. This is, in turn, linked to the exploitation of the country's resources for economic sustainable growth -arable land, forestry, minerals, natural gas, freshwater and marine resources; Burma is also a leading source of gemstone and jade. Exports of Burmese jade are booming, so much so that it is now a source of growing concern.
Clearly, economic growth is the principal driver for Burma's development, albeit not the only one. Since taking office in 2010, the civilian government has initiated a wide-ranging programme of economic and financial reforms to shift the country to an open market economy. These have included currency floatation, new fiscal regulations to rationalise personal income tax and reduce consumption tax, telecommunications sector liberalisation, private sector reforms and attracting FDI, a review of the financial sector, promotion of access to finance, and creating an economic climate conducive to job creation. According to World Bank data, the country's economy grew at 7.3 per cent in 2012/13. The main engines of growth were raised gas production, the services and construction sectors, FDI and strong commodity exports. The World Bank estimates that the economy will grow at 7.5 per cent in 2013/14 and increasing to 7.8 per cent in the medium term based on a continuing rise in gas production, increased trade and improved performance in agriculture. Burma's GDP is estimated to have been US$55 billion in 2012/13 (World Bank 2014). Burma's total foreign trade in 2012 was US$13.3 billion, contributing to about 27 per cent of its GDP. The country's ability to achieve its development aims depends not only on economic growth but also on processes of democratisation and enhanced governance practices. Attaining the development aims also requires societal stability and peace. The government has moved quickly to try and resolve the country's long-standing ethnic conflicts, although many challenges remain. The government has reached preliminary peace accords with all 11 of the main armed ethnic groups, following preliminary agreement with the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) on 30 May 2013 (Australian Government 2014).
Nevertheless, despite this, Burma's development challenge is substantial. For example, Burma's agricultural sector is weakened, pushing growing numbers of unskilled workers into the labour force where low remuneration and job seasonality causes many of these workers to migrate internally or abroad. According to the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), over 10 per cent of the total population are estimated to be working abroad. Participation in the national labour force is 50 per cent of women compared to 83 per cent of men, and 4.6 per cent of women are unemployed as opposed to 3.7 per cent of men. 'Unequal access to jobs and resources, compounded by the growing income gap, remain challenges to peaceful development' (SDC 2013: 9). problematic given that transport links are poor and highly vulnerable to intense climatic events (virtually half of all roads are made impassable during the monsoon season) and telecommunications and internet capacity is extremely limited. Only about one-quarter of Burmese have access to electricity. Rural poverty is double that found in urban centres and particularly high among the largely minority ethnic populations of Burma's border provinces and those regions emerging from conflict.
Burma's development aims
Burma's development path is set within the overall objectives of the reform process. There are four primary reform objectives: (1) balanced and proportionate growth among all states and divisions; (2) prioritisation of food security and amelioration of the agricultural sector; (3) development that is all-inclusive; and (4) ensuring the reliability of statistics and an overall improvement in primary data collection (Asia Tribune 2012). In May 2012, President Thein Sein set out the country's approach to national development (Thin 2013) . He identified the reform mechanisms by which Burma would achieve economic development by attracting international ODA and FDI and the administrative framework for managing and disbursing such funds as they are received. The goal is to triple GDP per capita in five years to US$3,900. To attract ODA, political reforms, the April 2012 elections and release of some political prisoners led to the easing of international sanctions. To draw in FDI, monetary and currency reforms were followed by a new Foreign Investment Law. These emphasise the importance of cutting poverty through infrastructural, agricultural and social development, 'including the creation of "good governance and clean government", private sector-led growth, and the use of participatory approaches' (SDC 2013: 11) . But the consultation and policy formulation process was criticised by some aid organisations for being based on a series of working groups drawn in large part from economic institutes in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan with limited civil societal participation (Oxfam 2014 China's 'development' interest in Burma is primarily economic. This has two main aspects.
Firstly, Burma as supplier; the country's location offers an alternative transit route for Middle East oil supplied to China, Burmese natural gas reserves, hydroelectric potential and raw materials to help meet China's pressing energy needs. Secondly, Burma as a market for Chinese goods, given the anticipated growth of the postreform economy. Both aspects can, potentially, act as development gains for Burma -a part of the answer to the development challengeparticularly if Burmese producers are able to enter into the value chain at a higher stage, based on a shift to a high-value economy. But they have also proven to be part of the problem. Chinese government and SOE corporate closeness to the Burmese military government and insensitivity to local community interests have generated increasing anti-Chinese sentiment unassuaged in the post-military rule years.
(a) Resources
China needs Burma's energy and raw materials which are vital to China's economic growth. The world's second largest economy was expected to grow by around 8 per cent in 2013. To sustain growth and meet rising consumer demands, it needs to import oil, gas and hydroelectric supplies as well as a range of raw materials from timber to strategic minerals. China's energy needs have grown considerably over the past 30 years of major economic growth and emerging consumer affluence, outstripping its domestic sources of supply, turning it into a net importer of oil and pushing it to import increasing amounts of oil and gas thereafter (EIA 2013). According to the EIA, China consumed 10.9 million barrels per day (bpd) but produced only 4.6 million bpd. China became the world's largest oil importer in September 2013 with demand exceeding supply by 6.3 million bpd (CBC News 2013).
It is a similar story with natural gas. Consumption in China went up from 25 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 2000 to over 100 bcm in 2010, and has been exceeding domestic production since 2007. China is actively seeking to cut its carbon emissions as well as diversify its energy base away from a 68 per cent dependency on coal. The Beijing government has prioritised natural gas as its best option -it aims to increase the share of gas in its energy profile from 4 per cent today to 10 per cent by 2020. However, while it seeks to double domestic gas production during this period, it also means that it will have to increase its imports significantly from 28.1 bcm in 2011 to an estimated 77 bcm a year by 2020 (Berdikeeva 2012 
China's development assistance
'Development' and international development assistance, as a defined area of Chinese foreign policy remains a work-in-process (Lum 2009 China's development approach is evident too in the controversial oil and gas pipeline construction. The project has been seeking to offset widespread opposition to the project and criticism of land expropriations, enforced dispossession, corruption and ecological disregard for rivers and forests. The project claims to have provided over 6,000 jobs for locals for the construction work, and involved over 220 Burmese firms with their employees being technically trained. They point to development aid projects undertaken along gas pipeline routes with US$20 million donated for use in education, medical treatment, health and disaster relief, 45 schools and 24 clinics built to improve the teaching facilities for 19,000 students and medical facilities for 800,000 local people. The venture offered US$10 million to repair a high voltage power grid line in Kyaukpyu, in which CNPC's donation accounted for US$3 million. In the second half of 2012, when Rakhine State experienced communal rioting, the project provided US$50,000 cash aid and ten tonnes of rice. Moreover, they also donated US$50,000 to earthquake victims in central Burma (China Daily 2013b) . Similarly, the company behind the oil pipeline, SEAOP, committed itself to 'assist' Burma in implementing 25 development projects in its pipeline project areas, worth US$1 million, in Rakhine State and the Magway region, providing 21 schools, two clinics and two kindergartens. The company claimed that, on completion, 1,320 villager patients, 105 preschool age children and 1,891 students would have benefited (GOV.cn 2012).
Illustrative of China's approach is the experience of one Chinese firm in the Burmese market, the China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CMC). The firm has followed a classic strategy of China's 'going out' policy of exporting from China, followed by in-country production backed by Chinese government development cooperation assistance. In the 1990s, the company exported railway locomotives to Myanmar. In 2000, the company established LPG factories in Nyaungdon and Kyunchaung. In the 2004-08 period, CMC built a number of 'free aid' projects on behalf of the Chinese government. These included a hydroelectric assembly plant, Mandalay industrial training centre, and an electricity meter factory. In 2007, the firm also drew on Chinese government preferential loans for the Burmese government to provide 20,000 tonnes of steel rails for Burma's Ministry of Railways. In 2010 the company and the Ministry of Railways signed an MoU making use of Chinese government preferential loans to construct a new locomotive assembly plant and bus assembly plant (CMC 2014).
China also provided humanitarian assistance to Burma for purposes of disaster relief, drugs control, education, medical and health. For example, China promised US$4.3 million in aid in addition to an initial US$1 million in the aftermath of the 2008 Cyclone Nargis. In 2013 China pledged aid for the resettlement of Burma's homeless in western Rakhine State and victims of the earthquake in northern Burma in the form of 350 integrated housing units worth 30 million yuan and US$1 million in cash for the resettlement of the victims (Chinese Embassy 2013). Technical assistance has also been extended to provide human resources training to about 2,000 persons covering more than 20 sectors, and aid in the form of engineering machinery, medical instruments and teaching equipment. For example, China equipped Yangon University and Mandalay University with 1,500 computers (ibid.).
Political relations
The modern diplomatic relationship goes back to establishment of formal relations between Burma and the PRC in 1950. The diplomatic language of high-level meetings frequently refers to their shared paukphaw (fraternal) friendship. Certainly, there is a historical legacy at play here, China's long-standing political support for Burma during its long years of international exile, vetoing condemnatory resolutions in the UN Security Council being merely one obvious feature of such support. China's public position is that it supports Burma's decision to reform. China has had a series of high-level reciprocal visits to maintain dialogue with the Burmese government to ensure sustained and sustainable bilateral relations with the new reforming administration. China's consideration here is that the process of wholesale societal transformation being undertaken in a relatively short time schedule maintains the stability of Burma; a managed process of reform that will not create instability in an adjacent state and threaten the viability of Chinese assets and operations in the country. Beijing was widely held to have been slow off the mark in recognising and responding to the changes in Burma (Horton 2013) . However accurate such impressions were, the Chinese government has moved to shore up its bilateral political ties with the new Burmese civilian leadership. Yet, an issue here relates to the very character of change taking place in Burma, with distinct resonances for China's own domestic and international reform trajectory. China's leaderships have always favoured and felt more comfortable working through government-togovernment relations. However, as in China, processes of economic and social change press political adjustments too. In China, the government has widely advocated the importance of people-to-people relations and the newly adopted reform strategy under President Xi Jinping has identified a more prominent role to be encouraged by civil society organisations. In Burma, political reform has opened up a new space for civil society and the media and also for new influence in the ethnic-oriented politics of Burma's constitutive states. There is, therefore, recognition of a need to engage in a more committed and demonstrably genuine way to the emerging role of Burmese civil society -one deeply sceptical or opposed to China's presence (Berger 2013; Yang 2012 
Security relations
The central Chinese security interests in Burma are that of border security and protection of Chinese strategic oil and gas supply pipelines.
(a) Border security
Border security has featured prominently in the series of China-Burma (Linn 2012) ? Given the duration of the military rule, it is a short period of time and requisite of a massive concerted and politically-charged process since 2011 to enact root-and-branch reform across the whole system. Nonetheless, the critical issue remains the structural power of the Burmese armed forces (Tatmadaw) in the Burmese market, alleged corporate cronyism and its long-established relations with segments of the Chinese military-political-economic elite.
The gas taps turned on in 2013 (People's Daily Online 2013), but the projects are mired in controversy and opposition. In addition, Burma's Rakhine State, where the pipeline begins, saw inter-communal violence between Buddhists and Muslims in June and October 2012 which left hundreds dead and injured. Oil and gas sales, sales of legally (and illegally) logged timber as well as narcotics from Burma's poppy-fields are all, allegedly, tied up with the Burmese military, its corporate grip on the country and its arms purchases.
But the competitive dimension with Japan is evident in the latter's ODA provision for Burma's port modernisation announced in December 2013 with the construction of two new general cargo wharves at the Myanmar International Terminals Thilawa (MITT) port paid for with a US$205 million Japanese ODA loan (consult-myanmar.com 2013).
Conclusions
International politics are rarely, if ever, 'zerosum'. China's interests in Burma, including a national interest in supporting Burma's economic and socio-political development, are clear. China's development assistance is framed in a wider concept and practice of 'economic cooperation'. This is delivering (swiftly) muchneeded major infrastructure to Burma.
Burma and China have symbiotic interests and long-standing relations that mean that, quite apart from the imperatives of geography, their relationship will be relatively close. But the relationship has been significantly one-sided in favour of China and Burma is now seeking to balance its China interests with those of a newly engaged international community and to work with China on a more equitable basis, for example, through BOT agreements and more joint ventures. 
